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I. INTRODUCrION
The leading edge issue in banking law today is-or ought to be-bank risk.
Every issue in banking law, whether it be bank failure policy,' entry restrictions, 2
geographic restrictions on the location of branches, 3 product market restrictions on
the scope of bank activities, 4 minimum capital requirements 5 or lending limits, 6 was,
at least ostensibly, promulgated in order to mitigate the problem of excessive
risk-taking by banks. Now that the massive losses facing the federal insurance
agencies responsible for protecting depositors' savings have come to represent a
realistic threat to the wealth of millions of investors, as well as a significant off-line
deficit item on the federal budget, the leading edge issue in banking law is becoming
a leading issue in domestic policy as well.7
This Article is not another description of the necessity of changing the direction
of banking policy to deal more effectively with the all important problem of bank
risk. The need for regulatory reform has been firmly established.8 The current
incidence of bank failures is directly linked to misguided banking policies which not
only prevent banks from reducing their exposure to risk by diversification, but
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actually provide clear incentives to banks to engage in excessively risky activities.9
In particular, as will be seen, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC)
policies for administering bank failures,' 0 and its refusal to price deposit insurance so
as to penalize excessive risk-taking by insured banks," defy explanation on public
policy grounds.12
Rather, the purpose of this Article is to consider the reasons why the regulation
of banking risk has been handled so badly and to assess the likelihood that change will
occur at all. As will be seen, the mere need for reform does not always result in
reform. Indeed, this Article predicts that meaningful change is unlikely to occur.
The next Part of this Article invokes a political scientist's perspective to explain
why bank regulation reflects the narrow concerns of special interest groups even
more completely than does most legislation. The following Part of the Article will
explain how current banking laws and regulations benefit the interest groups that
represent the banking industry, why bank risk is such an important issue, and how
current policies exacerbate the problem of bank insolvency. Finally, the last Part
explores the prospects for change.
II. THE FORMATION OF BANK POLICY IN THE AGE OF INTEREST GROUP DOMINATION
The public choice model of government decision-making predicts that banking
policy, like other forms of law, is produced by governmental entities, primarily
Congress and the relevant administrative agencies, the FDIC, the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Federal Reserve Board, at least in part in order to provide private
goods to powerful interest group constituencies. While the public choice model has
invoked this theory of governmental decision-making to explain virtually every
aspect of governmental behavior, '3 nowhere does the model appear to be more robust
than as applied to banking.14
The public choice model begins with the assumption that individuals, when
making public as well as private decisions, are motivated primarily by private
9. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 1173.
10. See id. at 1172-92.
11. K. Scott, supra note 8, at 7-8.
12. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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(1983); Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. Rev. 191 (1988); Macey, Transaction Costs
and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471
(1988); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & McmT. Sci. 3 (1971); Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv.
339 (1988).
14. See Benston, Federal Regulation of Banking: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 13 J. Bxnr REG. 216,
222 (1983); Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glanss-Steagall, 33
E..ORY L.J. 1 (1984). In fact, the special interest group orientation of certain banking statutes, particularly the
Glass-Steagall Act, is so obvious as to be assumed by thoughtful commentators. See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court
1983 Term: Foreward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 57 (1984) (describing the litigation by
the Securities Industry Association to apply the Glass-Steagall Act to restrict commercial banks from selling commercial
paper as representing its attempt to claim the "spoils of victory" gained by investment banking firms in the legislative
process). But see Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in
Federal Banking Regulation, 85 Mict. L. REv. 672, 713-16 (1987). See also Jackson, As Thrift Industry's Troubles and
Losses Mounted, Its PACs' Donations to Key Congressmen Surged. Vall St. J., Feb. 7, 1989, at A22, col. 1.
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interests rather than the public interest. 15 So, despite the fact that public decisions
(such as the proper direction for banking policy) apply to the entire polity, public
choice theory predicts that the outcomes of the decision-making process will be
influenced, and, at the margin, determined, by the private interests of the affected
decision-makers.
Public choice theory suggests that regulation will divert wealth from relatively
diffuse groups towards more organized groups whose members have strong individ-
ual interests in the regulation's effects. 16 The interests of those who are not in a
position to make themselves heard will not be registered in the calculus that produces
the final outcomes generated by the policy-makers. The theory explains that members
of large groups (up to and including the largest group of all-the general public) face
severe free-rider problems as they try to organize to provide benefits to themselves. 17
Those (usually relatively small) groups that are able to provide their members with
incentives for participating in policy formation (or disincentives for not participating)
will survive and flourish. Those groups that have a difficult time identifying issues,
organizing themselves into effective coalitions, and punishing free-riders will be less
successful. 18
This does not mean that law will never serve the public interest. Private interest
groups may often be benefited by laws that enhance efficiency or solve public goods
problems. Those groups will, on occasion, press for such laws. Laws designed to
deter theft, to protect the environment, and to provide for the national defense, for
example, benefit a broad range of interests even though they may be championed by
a narrow group that especially benefits. 19
In banking regulation, by contrast, the existence of a public benefit often is
impossible to ascertain. Restrictions on entry into the business of banking, on banks'
ability to branch, on banks' ability to engage in the underwriting of securities, and on
the scope of business activities banks can undertake, do not even appear to further the
public interest, but rather, appear simply to restrict competition, thereby limiting
consumer choice and raising the price consumers must pay to obtain the goods and
services provided by banks.20
There are four basic reasons why banking law and policy often do not bear even
the appearance of public-spiritedness. All four reasons are rooted in the collective
action problem that faces the highly variegated consumers of banking services, who
are not in a position to press for laws that benefit overall societal welfare. The
well-organized special interest groups that dominate the legislative process, as it
15. Lee, supra note 13, at 191.
16. This description is taken from Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, With an
Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311, 312 (1987).
17. See M. Ot.soN, THE LoGic OF CoutEcnvE AcnON (rev. ed. 1971).
18. See M. OLsoN, THE RISE AND DEcUNE OF NATIoNs 19-23 (1982).
19. The fact that laws appear to benefit the public does not mean that they in fact benefit the public. Certain laws
that appear to benefit the public in fact merely transfer wealth to special interest groups. See Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLura. L. REv. 223, 228
(1986). Of course, some laws that appear to benefit the public actually do. Id.
20. See Fisehel, supra note 8, at 319-36.
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pertains to the banking industry, do not appear to benefit by pressing for regulations
that increase efficiency. Rather, these special interest groups appear to benefit most
from rules that transfer wealth from less organized consumers to more organized
producers.
The first reason why there is little pressure for modern banking law to reflect
efficiency concerns is that deposit insurance deprives private sector actors of any
reason to concern themselves with excessive bank risk-taking. The second reason is
that the administrative agencies regulating banks do not have broad based constitu-
encies. As a consequence, administrative agencies are not forced to resolve disputes
among conflicting interests. Rather, their constituencies appear to consist exclusively
of highly organized special interest groups. Third, the issues involved in banking
regulation do not involve the sorts of concerns that individual citizens are likely to
find appealing. Generally, when people express themselves politically, they do so
because they find meaning and satisfaction in the political process. 2' The complex,
nitty-gritty sorts of issues that describe the contours of national banking policy do not
provide people with the feeling of satisfaction from participating in the political
process. Therefore, people whose interests are not directly affected do not participate
as they do in other issues such as civil rights and foreign policy. 22 Finally, the
banking issues that must be confronted are of such a complex and politically
unimportant nature that few members of Congress find it in their interest to become
very knowledgeable about them. Thus, because legislators are not informed about the
issues they are called upon to consider, even the most well-meaning legislators are
likely to be highly influenced by special interest groups as they go about formulating
banking policies for the nineties.
A. Deposit Insurance
A substantial portion of individual wealth, particularly disposable wealth, is tied
up in demand deposits at banks. Depositors obviously have a large stake in making
sure that these demand deposit funds remain safe. In the absence of deposit insurance,
of course, bank depositors would face potential losses whenever the banks in which
they had deposits became insolvent. Because of the high stakes involved for
individual investors, such investors could be expected to overcome the usual
collective action problems facing large groups and galvanize into an effective
political force to lobby for protection against excessive bank risk-taking. But, in the
presence of deposit insurance these depositors are completely insulated from the
consequences of bank failure and have no incentive whatsoever to press for
legislation that would make banks less likely to fail.
Depositors are not only insulated from the economic consequences of bank
failure, they are also indifferent to the way that bank failure policy is administered by
the regulatory agencies. This is because depositors have no reason to concern
21. Lee, supra note 13, at 193.
22. Cf. id. at 196-97.
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themselves with the details of how their insurance fund is administered so long as
they are repaid promptly in the event of a bank failure.
Some have argued that deposit insurance is efficient. In particular, Fischel,
Rosenfield, and Stillman take the position that bank depositors face a collective
action problem that comes in the form of a prisoner's dilemma, and that deposit
insurance serves to overcome this prisoner's dilemma. According to this argument,
rational bank depositors realize that all depositors cannot demand repayment of their
deposits simultaneously because the bank does not have sufficient funds on hand at
any given time to satisfy its obligations to all depositors. 23 If a significant percentage
of depositors attempt to withdraw their funds at the same time, then the bank will be
forced to liquidate its assets "at distress prices," thereby rendering the bank
insolvent, and jeopardizing the interests of those depositors foolish enough to refrain
from making early withdrawals. Thus:
[lI]f some class of depositors does decide, for whatever reason, to withdraw assets from the
bank, other depositors will rationally conclude that they must do the same to avoid being left
with nothing. The result of such a "run" on the bank's assets may be the failure of a
previously solvent bank to the detriment of depositors as a group. 24
This collective action problem among depositors is no different from the collective
action problem among creditors of other businesses. If all creditors demand payment
at once, firms will find it difficult to repay everybody. 25 But, because banks have
such a high percentage of their assets in the form of long term loans, and such a high
percentage of their liabilities in the form of deposits that are payable on demand, the
problem facing banks is particularly acute. 26
Here, however, Fischel, Rosenfield, and Stillman appear to confuse cause and
effect. The reason the collective action problem is so acute in banking, they argue,
is because of the asymmetry between the maturity structure of banking assets and the
maturity structure of banking liabilities. 27 But there is nothing preventing banks from
designing their asset portfolio to match their liabilities by purchasing highly liquid
short-term assets. This would eliminate the collective action problem facing
depositors in ways similar to deposit insurance. Thus, the design of deposit insurance
makes it possible for banks to have a disparity between the maturity structure of their
assets and liabilities. Absent such a design, rational depositors would prefer to place
their deposits at banks that matched the maturity structure of bank assets with those
of bank liabilities.2 8
23. Fischel, supra note 8, at 307.
24. Id. at 308.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 308-09.
27. Id.
28. Note that the ability of banks to securitize their assets makes it increasingly less costly for them to match assets
and liabilities. Securitization refers to the process of packaging a group of income-producing assets together and creating
a new security which offers the purchaser the stream of income generated by the underlying assets. The purchasers of the
new securities provide the selling bank with immediate liquidity, thus eliminating the disparity between long term assets
and short term liabilities.
12811989]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Thus, the FDIC does not appear to be the only solution to the collective action
problem facing bank depositors. Indeed, the problem itself does not appear to be
particularly intractable because banks themselves can solve the problem by readjust-
ing their asset portfolios to match the maturity structure of their liability portfolios.
A public interest justification for deposit insurance similar to Fischel, Rosen-
field, and Stillman's was formulated by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz in their
seminal book on monetary policy.29 Their claim is that deposit insurance prevents
bank runs by protecting public confidence in the banking system:
[T]he knowledge on the part of small depositors that they will be able to realize on their
deposits even if the bank should experience financial difficulties prevents the failure of one
bank from producing "runs" on other banks that in turn may force "sound" banks to
suspend. Deposit insurance is thus a form of insurance that tends to reduce the contingency
insured against .... namely, the prevention of banking panics. 30
But, as Fischel, Rosenfield, and Stillman have pointed out, there is absolutely no
evidence that bank failures are contagious in the first place:
[I]t is not clear why a run on any one bank should necessarily unnerve depositors at others.
Indeed, there is no reason why depositors at a bank should be more unsettled by a failure of
another bank than by the failure of a manufacturing firm. The failure of a large local
manufacturing firm may send a signal about the probable quality of a local bank's loan
portfolio that is far more relevant to depositors than the signal sent by the failure of a bank
in another state. 3'
Unless the failure at the first bank conveys some information to depositors at other
banks, there is no reason at all why bank failures should be contagious.3 2 Indeed, in
the likely event that the funds that are withdrawn from one bank are deposited in other
banks, these other banks stand to benefit from the failure of the first bank. 33
Thus, the public interest is not served by deposit insurance in any of the ways
that have been previously credited. A more likely justification for deposit insurance
begins by treating a depositor as another form of investor seeking a safe investment.
Deposit insurance increases the safety of bank deposits, but depositors must pay for
this increase in safety through lower interest rates on their savings.
Another advantage of insured deposits is that depositors do not have to engage
in a costly search process to enable them to distinguish relatively safe banks from
relatively risky banks. While banks themselves (particularly healthy banks) would
have a strong incentive to do everything they can to help depositors make this
distinction, small depositors would still have to invest significant resources in
obtaining the expertise necessary to determine which banks offer the best combina-
tion of safety and return.
29. M. FiEmoAN & A. SctwARrZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNrIED STATES, 1867-1960 (1963) [hereinafter
FmmARN].
30. Id. at 440.
31. Fischel, supra note 8, at 310-11.
32. Aharony & Swary, Contagion Effects of Bank Failures: Evidence From Capital Markets, 56 J. Bus. 305, 321
(1983).
33. Cf. Fischel, supra note 8, at 310.
1282 [Vol. 49:1277
POLITICAL SCIENCE OF REGULATING BANK RISK
While it is costly for depositors to obtain information about the banks with which
they propose to deal, depositors will invest resources in obtaining such information
up to the point where these costs equal the expected benefit. This benefit comes in the
form of a reduced probability that the depositors will lose their funds. In the absence
of federal deposit insurance, however, it is likely that private insurance funds would
have evolved to provide depositors with protection in the event of a bank failure) 4
Such private deposit insurance might be obtained by the bank itself as a form of third
party bonding, or it might be obtained directly by depositors. In either case, these
forms of private insurance would force banks to internalize the costs of their own
risky activities.
The point here is that, contrary to popular belief, the primary beneficiary of
deposit insurance appears to be the insured banks themselves rather than the
depositors. This argument becomes almost self-evident when one observes that even
during the incredible four-year period from 1930-1933 when 9000 banks failed or
suspended operation, losses to depositors came to only 1.3 billion dollars as
compared to losses of 85 billion dollars suffered by holders of common and preferred
stock. 35 Indeed, as Professor Tussig observed in his classic article on the subject of
bank failure:
Losses inflicted today upon depositors as a consequence of bank failure may in many cases
be less disruptive than a great many ordinary economic hazards of which society takes little
or no cognizance. "The failure of a textile mill in a one-mill New England town," Horvitz
has recently observed, "is almost certainly a greater community disaster than the failure of
the local bank in a one-bank town." 36
We protect bank depositors against the loss of their deposits, yet we do not protect
workers against the loss of their jobs. This is particularly odd in light of the fact that
depositors are in a much better position to protect themselves against the loss of their
deposits than workers are able to protect themselves against the loss of their jobs.
Depositors can shift their deposits among banks easily and cheaply. Workers, many
of whom have large, firm-specific capital investments in the firms for which they
work, cannot shift jobs easily or cheaply and cannot obtain insurance against plant
closings. 37
The above arguments suggest that the public interest justification for deposit
insurance may not be as strong as is generally thought. This is peculiar in light of the
fact that deposit insurance enjoys overwhelming popular support. Indeed, retention of
deposit insurance is probably one of the most revered of sacred cows in the political
world. If federal insurance of deposits served only the interests of some narrow
interest group coalition, such widespread popular support would be unlikely.
34. Id. at 316-17. See also Gorton, Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States, 45J.
ECON. Htsr. 277 (1985) (describing the market-generated arrangements that came into being in the days before deposit
insurance to make banks less susceptible to systematic failure).
35. Fkinsm t, supra note 29, at 351.
36. Tussig, The Case for Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & EcoN. 129, 145 (1967) (quoting Horvitz, Simulating Bank
Competition Through Regulatory Action, 20 J. FIN. 1, 3 (1965)).
37. See Macey, Externalities, Firm Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental
Corporate Changes, 1989 DuKE L.J. _ .
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Nonetheless, it is clear that the costs to the public have been greatly understated,
because depositors pay for the benefits they receive from deposit insurance in the form
of lower interest rates on deposits, while the benefits to insured depository institutions
have been tremendously overstated. This point becomes far clearer when one observes
how deposit insurance is administered.3 8 Most importantly, deposit insurance deprives
insured depositors of any incentive at all to press for constructive change in banking
regulation. Banks can lobby for unsafe, anticompetitive regulations without fear that
consumer groups will challenge the regulations on the ground that they endanger the
interests of depositors. The fact that depositors are insured thus deprives the regulatory
process of a much needed voice, which, in the absence of such insurance, would
fervently press for regulations that protected depositors' interests.
B. Administrative Agencies' Constituencies
Capture theory, which was one of the earliest manifestations of what has evolved
into the modern economic theory of regulation, posits that over time, regulatory
agencies become dominated and controlled by the industries they regulate.3 9 Unlike
later theories, capture theory "singles out a particular interest group-the regulated
firms-as prevailing in the struggle to influence legislation, and it predicts a regular
sequence, in which the original purposes of a regulatory program are later thwarted
through the efforts of the interest group."40
Capture theory has not survived as a convincing theory of regulation. 41 Capture
theory is particularly unsatisfying where more than one group is regulated by the
agency in question.42 For example, capture theory is particularly weak at explaining
or predicting the actions of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which
regulates such competing modes of transportation as trucks, railroads, and barge lines.
Each of these industries exerts influence on the ICC, and the primitive capture theory
is incapable of telling us which industry is likely to dominate the regulatory process.
But, by parity of reasoning, capture theory is a much more promising candidate
for predicting regulatory behavior where the regulatory agency in question regulates
a single industry whose membership has more or less unified interests and goals. This
is the case in the banking industry. The Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller)
has primary regulatory responsibility for national banks. 43 State banks are regulated
by state banking officials, unless they are members of the Federal Reserve System,
in which case their primary regulator is the Federal Reserve Board. 44 Savings banks
38. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (discussing the administration of deposit insurance).
39. M. BERNSTEI, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT CoMMISSION 3-4 (1955); See H. ZIEE, INTEREST
GROUPS IN AMERicA 119-20 (1964); Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the
Public Interest, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ANDPOLICY, SELEcrED ESSAYS 58 (P. woll ed. 1966); Leiserson, Interest Groups
in Administration, in ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 314 (F. Morstein Marx ed. 1946).
40. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & Morr. Sc. 335, 341-42 (1974).
41. Id. at 342 (capture theory is still unsatisfying and "lacks any theoretical foundation").
42. Cf. id. (capture theory "has no predictive or explanatory power at all when a single agency regulates separate
industries having conflicting interests").
43. See generally E. SYIONS & J. WHITE, BANKING LAW TEACING MATERIALS 46 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter S'soNs
& WHITE].
44. Id.
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and savings and loan associations are regulated by state authorities or by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, which administers the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC). 45 Thus, each constituency has its own regulatory agency,
which is not responsible to other interests. This state of affairs increases the
likelihood that bank regulators will succumb to regulatory capture, because, unlike
regulatory agencies such as the ICC, the interests of bank regulators are not divided
among a large number of constituents.
The one exception to this situation is the Federal Reserve Board (Board), which
is not only responsible for regulating state bank members of the Federal Reserve
System, but also for conducting the nation's monetary policy, as well as for financing
the federal government's budget deficit through the sale of Treasury bills, notes, and
bonds. These latter two fuinctions bring the Board into regular contact with
investment banks, which purchase these governmental debt instruments for resale to
retail and institutional investors. Thus, unlike other bank regulatory agencies, the
Board is less likely to conform to the crude capture model of regulatory behavior
because investment banks, as well as commercial banks, come under its aegis.
Recent attempts by commercial banks to enter the securities business provide
striking examples of both the divided loyalty of the Board and the undivided loyalty
of the Comptroller. For example, the Comptroller approved an application by a
commercial bank, which already operated a discount brokerage business, to establish
an operating subsidiary to provide investment advisory services. 46 Even though the
combination of these two services-discount brokerage and investment advice-
enabled banks to offer retail customers every securities-related service that a full
service brokerage house could provide, the Comptroller, consistent with the capture
theory presented here, had no trouble permitting commercial banks to enter this line
of business despite the obvious tension between the Comptroller's decision and the
purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act.47
When certain large bank holding companies wanted to establish subsidiaries to
engage in underwriting and selling commercial paper, they were required to obtain
approval from the Board, the federal agency with regulatory responsibility for the
activities of all bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries. Section 20 of
the Glass-Steagall Act, which forbids affiliations between banks and firms "engaged
45. Id.
46. See Ruling Allows Bank to Offer Investment Advisory Service, At. BAN.ER, Sept. 14, 1983, § 1, at 4.
47. See Macey, supra note 14, at 28-29 (the Comptroller's decision "leaves very little of Glass-Steagall intact").
Another example of the divided loyalty of the Board came in the wake of the decision by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia that gave the Board regulatory responsibility over the activities of the banking subsidiaries of bank
holding companies. See American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 854 F.2d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1988). After this decision, the Board
moved quickly "to exert greater control over state-chartered member banks'investment in risky, non-banking businesses
such as real estate development." Taylor, Fed Moves to Require Bank Units to Seek its Approval for Any Outside
Businesses, Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1988, at A6, col. 5. On January 18, 1989, the Board approved the applications of several
bank holding companies to underwrite corporate debt despite strong resistance from the Securities Industry Association.
The Board, however, maintained its position that the underwriting of securities such as corporate debt must be conducted
by a separate subsidiary and can't generate more than 5% of the subsidiary's gross revenue. Duke, Fed Moves to Allow
Banks to Underwrite Corporate Debt; Equity Powers Withheld, Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1989, at A3, col. 2. An interesting
question is why the Board deferred for one year its decision on whether banks can underwrite corporate equities. See infra
text accompanying note 51.
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principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution ... of
stocks, bonds, debentures, or other securities" 48 clearly envisions that subsidiaries of
bank holding companies (affiliates) will be able to engage in the securities business
so long as they are not engaged principally in this business.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System v. Agnew, 49 had indicated that firms would not be engaged in the
securities business unless fifty-one percent of their business was derived from
securities related activities.50 Despite this support for permitting bank holding
company subsidiaries to engage in a wide variety of securities activities, the Board
will not permit such subsidiaries to derive more than "5 percent of their total gross
revenues from ... [securities activities] over any two year period.' '51
In case there was any doubt that the strict limitation on the ability of bank
holding company subsidiaries to deal in commercial paper was anything other than a
political compromise with the Board's other constituency, the securities industry, the
Board also imposed a limit on the market share of the commercial paper industry that
bank holding company subsidiaries would be able to capture. Securities firms had
long been involved in the commercial paper business, and these firms were concerned
that their traditional control of the market would be undermined by competition from
bank holding company subsidiaries. But the Board had absolutely no statutory or
administrative authority for imposing market share limitations on holding company
subsidiaries involved in the sale of commercial paper. Nor do such conditions appear
to bear any relationship to the ostensible public policies underlying the Glass-Steagall
Act.5 2 The apparent public policy purposes for this regulation were to eliminate the
conflicts of interest arising from the combination of commercial banking and
investment banking and to prevent banks from engaging in an enterprise which was
considered to be too risky for commercial banks. Conflicts of interest were said
inevitably to arise whenever commercial banks engaged in the securities business,
because commercial bankers would do things such as make unsound loans to promote
improvident securities sales and render biased investment advice in order to achieve
the same goal.5 3 Intolerable levels of risk were said to arise if banks were allowed to
invest their own assets in securities5 4 (although it is impossible to imagine that all
48. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982).
49. 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
50. Id. at 447-48.
51. Order Approving Applications to Engage in Limited Undenriting and Dealing in Certain Securities, 73 Fed.
Res. Bull. 473, 485-86 (1987).
52. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2830 (1988).
In overturning the Fed's imposition of market share limitations, the circuit court ruled that market share limitations were
not supported by the Glass-Steagall Act:
We discern no support in § 20 [of the Act] for the Board's market share limitation.... Mhe fact that [the
increasing market share of commercial banks in traditional investment banking activities] was brought to
Congress's attention and that Congress did not directly address it is... a strong indication that Congress was
not concerned about market share.
53. Id. at 68. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630-33 (1971) (describing the "plain conflict"
between the promotional activities of the stockbroker and the "obligation of the commercial banker to render disinterested
investment advice").
54. Id. at 630.
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investments in stocks are inherently more risky than all investments in other
commercial banking activities). 55
Thus, while all of the administrative agencies that deal with banking regulation
appear to respond to pressure from interest groups, only one, the Board, must respond
to pressure from a variety of constituencies. The others all face a constituency more
or less unified in its preferences for regulation. As a consequence of the regulatory
environment in which banks operate, capture theory is likely to provide an unusually
useful model for predicting the outcomes generated by the industry's administrative
agencies.
C. The Issues: Complexity and Ennui
Earlier in this Article, I argued that one of the hidden costs of federal deposit
insurance is that it deprives individual depositors of a motive for attempting to make
banking regulation more efficient.5 6 But the fact that someone has no personal
economic stake in a particular issue does not necessarily mean that they will decline
to take an interest in the issue. We commonly observe people taking an active interest
in a variety of issues, ranging from aid to the Contras to the plight of the homeless,
in which they have no personal economic stake.
People lobby, vote, and engage in other forms of political expression for a
variety of noneconomic reasons. Political activities reinforce an individual's sense of
community, self-worth, and moral virtue. Political activities also provide people with
what Dwight Lee has described as "ideological satisfaction:"- 57
[P]eople receive satisfaction from participating in processes they feel are important, from
supporting things they believe are good, and from opposing things they believe are bad.
People are motivated to go to the polls and vote for much the same reason they are motivated
to go to the sports arena and cheer. It is the satisfaction that comes from participation and
expression, not the expectation that they will determine the outcome, that draws people to
the polls and to the sports arena. There is no more difficulty reconciling voting with private
interest than there is with reconciling attendance at sporting events with private interest5 8
Unfortunately, the sorts of rules that influence whether banks will operate safely
do not provide individual voters with meaningful outlets for ideological expression.
This is particularly true for issues involving bank risk.
The existence of deposit insurance creates the need to design regulatory
strategies that reduce banks' levels of risk-taking to acceptable levels. Deposit
insurance, like other forms of insurance, creates a moral hazard problem from the
perspective of the insured parties. In other words, deposit insurance makes it more
attractive for banks to engage in risky activities because a portion of the costs of these
risky activities is borne by the insurance companies.5 9 In the private sector, a variety
55. See Macey, supra note 14, at 11.
56. See supra text accompanying note 38.
57. Lee, supra note 13, at 195.
58. Id. at 193.
59. Fischel, supra note 8, at 314.
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of mechanisms are used to control this moral hazard problem.W Once the decision to
employ federally administered deposit insurance programs is made, a major task of
those who administer the programs is to select among these various mechanisms the
combination that will be most effective in reducing bank risk. Despite the importance
of these issues, these decisions are not the type that the average voter will find
interesting or ideologically appealing.
In many corporate settings, the problem of excessive risk-taking is mitigated
because a firm's managers prefer to engage in a lower level of risk-taking than that
considered optimal by the shareholders. In these firms, shareholders face coordina-
tion cost problems and monitoring cost problems that make it difficult for them to
detect and punish this sort of managerial misbehavior. 61 Most banks, however, do not
have this protection against excessive risk-taking because they are owned by holding
companies, which means that they have but one shareholder. Thus, problems of
monitoring and coordination are eliminated. Moreover, many small banks are closely
held, so that they too, are unlikely to engage in levels of risk-taking that are
suboptimal from the shareholders' perspective. Therefore, unlike many firms, banks
will engage in levels of risk-taking that are close to optimal from the shareholders'
perspective.
Similarly, other issues regarding bank risk, such as what lines of business are
appropriate for banks, what types of geographic restrictions, if any, should be
imposed, what minimum capital requirements should be maintained, or what bank
lending limits should be, are not the kind of issues in which the average citizen will
choose to become immersed. Thus, unlike many regulatory agencies, banking
agencies are not going to find themselves confronted with an array of consumer
groups when they are called upon to make policy as it relates to bank risk.
D. Issue Complexity and Capture Theory
The final reason why banking regulation is likely to conform especially well to
capture theory is that the issues are so complex. Extremely complex regulatory issues
are especially likely to be resolved in ways that benefit special interest groups for
three reasons. First, it simply does not pay for politicians to inform themselves about
such issues in sufficient detail to make informed judgments about what is in the best
interests of their constituents. Politicians cannot come close to mastering all of the
details of the incredible array of issues with which they are confronted on a daily
basis. The committee system was designed, in part, to enable legislators to specialize
in particular issues. It has long been recognized that congressional committees, which
are largely staffed by the legislators who have the largest stake in a particular policy
area,62 have enormous power. 63 It is also clear that committee members have
60. Id. at 314 (citing deductibles, co-insurance, and risk-related premiums as examples of devices that "force the
insured to internalize the costs of engaging in risky activities").
61. See Macey & Miller, supra note I.
62. Riker & Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of ludicial
Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. Rev. 373, 386 (1988) [hereinafter Riker].
63. See Baron & Ferejohn, Bargaining and Agenda Formation in Legislatures, 77 Am. EcoN. Rev. 303 (1987);
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substantially more influence over particular regulatory outcomes than do legislators
who are not members of the relevant committee. 64 In large part, the evidence shows
that the ability of legislative committees to formulate the agenda of a proposed
legislative package gives the committee extraordinary power. 65 Although the com-
plexity of the issue already gives the legislative committee a virtual monopoly on the
relevant information about the pros and cons of a proposed legislative package, the
committee's power is further enhanced because it does not pay for other lawmakers
to become informed about the intricacies of the policies under the command of the
relevant committee. Thus, in an area such as banking, the deference typically
afforded to the relevant congressional committees is especially great.
Second, complex issues, such as those involved in controlling excessive
risk-taking by banks, are likely to be resolved in a way that benefits special interest
groups because complex issues are likely to produce complex statutes. Complex
statutes can be touted as serving a generalized public interest when they really serve
the narrow goals of special interest groups. Put another way, the complex statutes
necessary to meet the problems of excessive risk-taking by banks can be easily
designed to mask what I have termed "hidden-implicit" deals with special interest
groups. 66 Hidden-implicit statutes are statutes that are couched in public interest
terms in order "to avoid the political fallout associated with blatant special interest
statutes," 67 but actually, are designed to transfer wealth to a special interest group.
Third, special interest concerns are likely to dominate statutes designed to deal
with the problem of excessive risk-taking by banks because the cost of obtaining
sufficient information to make an informed judgment about complex issues provides
a decisive advantage for special interest groups. From the perspective of the general
public, the process of making public policy is plagued by what political scientists call
the problem of rational ignorance. Rational ignorance refers to the fact that
"members of the mass public will generally find it irrational to obtain the information
necessary to identify their interests on any given issue and moreover will be ill
equipped to interpret any information they do obtain. "68 It is irrational for members
of the general public to obtain information about issues concerning bank risk not only
because the probability that such information can be used to affect legislative
outcomes is very low, but also because obtaining such information is very costly. By
contrast, it is cost effective for special interest groups such as banks to obtain
information about the issues pertaining to bank risk because they obtain this
information during the course of their ordinary business operations. These special
interest groups (such as the American Bankers Association) inevitably will present to
Denzau & Mackay, Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated
Behavior, 27 AM. J. POL. Sc. 740 (1983); Shepsle & Weingast, Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 Am.
PoL. Sci. Ray. 85 (1987).
64. Riker, supra note 62, at 387; Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent
Perspective (With Applications to the SEC), 44 PuB. CHOICE 147 (1984).
65. Riker, supra note 62, at 386-88.
66. See Macey, supra note 19, at 233.
67. Id.
68. M. HAYES, LOB1YISTS AN LGIsLAToRs: A THEORY OF PotrncAt MARs 69-70 (1981).
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legislators the version of the facts that is most favorable to their point of view. The
legislators will not receive any other viewpoint because only interest groups find it
worthwhile to invest the resources to obtain, systematize, and convey arguments
about such a complex issue to Congress. Thus, when it comes to a complex issue like
bank risk, even well meaning, public-regarding legislators are likely to be misled into
blindly following the policy course preferred by special interest groups because such
groups will dominate the flow of information that these legislators receive.
III. To THE VicroRs Go THE Spoes
The above Part has outlined four reasons why capture theory is likely to
provide an unusually robust model of agency behavior in the realm of banking
industry. First, unlike other areas of regulation, and because of deposit insurance,
banking consumer groups have no incentive to press for regulations that promote
bank safety and soundness. Second, unlike many administrators, bank regulators,
with the exception of the Board, do not have to answer to a "multi-industry
'clientele.' "69 Third, banking regulation does not present individual voters with
salient issues that provide useful vehicles for ideological expression. Finally, the
complexity of the issues in banking regulation creates a situation in which it will be
in the interests of only a small number of politicians to invest sufficient resources to
become knowledgeable enough to participate meaningfully in policy debates. These
politicians will easily be able to respond to industry pressure in such a way that it
appears that they are acting in the public interest.
This Part describes some of the ways in which banking law and regulation has
come to benefit the interests it supposedly controls by actually making banks more
risky. It is important to emphasize, however, that the argument here is not that
banking policy specifically is designed to increase bank riskiness. Rather, the
argument is that banking laws and regulations provide pervasive benefits to the
banking industry, but pay virtually no attention to addressing the basic reason for the
increasing incidence of bank failure: current regulations subsidize excessive risk-
taking by federally insured banks.
A. The Glass-Steagall Act
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act (Act)70 prohibits banks from underwriting,
selling, and dealing in securities. 7 1 Section 21 prohibits persons and firms "engaged
69. The phrase is taken from Posner, supra note 40, at 342.
70. The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name for §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48
Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
71. Section 16, codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), provides that:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [national bank] shall be limited to purchasing and selling
such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no
case for its own account, and the [national bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock....
Section 16 contains exceptions for municipal bonds and debt obligations of the United States Government, as well as for
purchases and sales "without recourse, solely upon the order and for the account of customers." Id.
Section 5(c) of Glass-Steagall makes the restrictions imposed by § 16 applicable to state chartered banks that are
members of the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) ("State member banks shall be
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in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing ... stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or other securities" from offering checking or savings accounts. 72
The public interest justification for the Act was that the commercial banks
shouldered a large share of the responsibility for the Depression because of the
speculative securities activities of their affiliates. 73 According to Congress, these
affiliates made "one of the greatest contributions to the unprecedented disaster which
has caused this almost incurable depression." 74 This public interest justification for
the Act is extremely implausible. 75 If the securities activities of bank affiliates really
were to blame for the Depression, then the Act should have prohibited such activities.
But, as seen above, Section 20 of the Act permits bank affiliates to deal in securities,
so long as such affiliates are not "engaged principally" in such activities. 76
The better argument seems to be that the Act was designed to benefit both
commercial banks and investment banks by restricting competition in both
industries. 77 Upon passage of the Act, there was an immediate diminution in the
supply of both commercial and investment banking services, as investment banks
departed from the commercial banking business and commercial banks ceased their
subject to the same limitations and conditions with respect to the purchasing, selling, underwriting and holding of
investment securities and stock as are applicable in the case of national banks under paragraph 'Seventh' of section 24 of
this title.") The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552, reprinted in 1987 U.S.
CODE CO o. & ADIIte. NEws 566-72, makes the restrictions of § 16 applicable to state chartered banks that are not
members of the Federal Reserve System.
72. Section 21, codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982), provides that:
[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person... or... organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting,
selling, or distributing.. . stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time...
in the business of receiving deposits.
73. S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 6-7 (1933).
74. 75 CoNG. REc. S9887 (1932) (remarks of Senator Glass).
75. Recently, Professor Donald Langevoort proferred anew public interest justification for the Glass-Steagall Act's
separation of commercial and investment banking. He claims that "[p]robably the most underestimated recurrent political
goal in banking regulation has been that of influencing the use of funds in the financial system." Langevoort, supra note
14, at 683. "Channelling" is the term that has been used to describe the legislative goal of influencing how funds are used
within the financial system. Id. As applied to Glass-Steagall, it is Professor Langevoort's contention that Congress was
troubled by the fact that during the 1920's banks often loaned money to individuals and securities fins to help them
finance securities purchases. Id. at 694. In fact, Langevoort claims that the discovery that 41% of all commercial bank
assets were invested in securities or securities related loans was "the most significant statistic leading to eventual passage
of [the Glass-Steagall Act]." Id.
Langevoort's analysis is questionable in light of the fact that Glass-Steagall did absolutely nothing to prohibit
commercial banks from making loans to individuals for the purpose of buying securities, or from making loans to
securities firms for the same purpose. Indeed, Langevoort's analysis is rather ironic in light of the fact that during the stock
market crash of October 1987, the hesitancy of commercial banks to extend credit to securities firms was a source of great
concern to regulators, particularly the Federal Reserve Board, which reportedly exerted significant pressure on
commercial banks to extend funds to brokerage houses in need of cash.
But the major flaw in the argument that Glass-Steagall somehow was intended to channel banking activities in a
particular direction is that bank lending and securities underwriting, which Glass-Steagall attempts to separate, are
substitutes for one another. Thus, Langevoort's argument that lending by commercial banks to individuals and frns
involved in the securities business deprived other businesses of capital is untenable because the securities firms that
received this money from commercial banks were using it to supply businesses with capital by purchasing and
underwriting corporate debt and equity.
76. See supra text accompanying note 48 (describing § 20 of Glass-Steagall). For additional arguments that the
Glass-Steagall Act serves private rather than public interests, see Macey, supra note 14.
77. Macey, supra note 14, at 17.
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investment banking activities. 78 Barriers to entry in both industries would ensure that
the gains from cartelization would endure. 79
The Act, however, does nothing to further the interests of bank safety, and in all
likelihood, actually makes banks more risky by preventing them from attaining a
low-cost means to diversify their loan portfolios. It is clear that underwriting
securities is no more dangerous than traditional commercial banking activities such as
making loans. The decision by a bank to make a commercial loan is no different than
the decision of a trader at an investment bank to purchase a corporate bond or other
security. The key elements of both decisions are: 1) the riskiness of the investment,
2) the return on the investment, and 3) the effect of the investment on the overall
riskiness of the firm's portfolio. But, unlike most commercial loans, securities can be
easily sold in pre-existing, well-established secondary trading markets. This means
that firms that purchase securities, unlike firms that make loans, can dispose of their
investments quickly in the event of changing market conditions or other circum-
stances. In addition, highly liquid options and futures markets make it possible to
hedge securities portfolios against market risk. Thus, it is not possible to maintain
that investment banking is inherently more risky than commercial banking.
Indeed, as Fischel, Rosenfield, and Stillman have pointed out, modem corporate
finance theory demonstrates that combining traditional banking activities with
nonbanking activities such as investment banking "may reduce the overall riskiness"
of the bank because the combination of these activities makes it possible for the bank
to obtain the benefits of a portfolio effect for its assets.80 Specifically, if bank
portfolios can include investment banking activities that do well when its traditional
banking activities are doing poorly, it will reduce its overall level of risk. Thus, by
denying banks the opportunity to diversify their asset portfolios, the Act forecloses
one avenue by which banks could reduce the probability of insolvency.
B. The Pricing of Deposit Insurance
Perhaps the clearest example of a bank failure policy that promotes excessive
risk-taking by banks is the pricing of deposit insurance. Banks are charged a flat rate
78. It is sometimes said that the only interest group to benefit from the Glass-Steagall Act was the investment
banking industry. See Macey, supra note 14, at 16 (Glass-Steagall "represents the triumph of one special interest group,
the investment bankers, over another interest group, the commercial bankers."); Benston, supra note 14, at 222 ("the
evidence supports the belief that the investment bankers and underwriters were concerned about severe competition from
banks and bank affiliates and sought (successfully in 1933) to eliminate those competitors"); Langevoort, supra note 14,
at 691 (claiming that those who approach the Glass-Steagall Act from an interest group perspective believe that "the Act
is simple special-interest legislation on behalf of the investment banking community"). But it seems clear that
Glass-Steagall benefited commercial banks by insulating them from competition from investment banks for deposit
dollars, as well as benefitting investment banks. In this way, the politicians who supported Glass-Steagall can be seen as
maximizing their political support from both of the interested special-interest groups. This model is consistent with the
private interest paradigm elaborated by Peltzman. See Peltzman, supra note 13; see also Haddock & Macey, supra note
16, at 319-24 (describing the political support maximization model in graphic form).
79. In commercial banking the barriers to entry come in the form of entry restrictions imposed by state and federal
chartering authorities. See Butler & Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CoRNELL L. Ray.
677, 684-89 (1988) (describing entry restrictions). In the securities industry, which has long enjoyed heavy concentration
and high profitability, the entry restrictions appear to come from the fact that reputational capital is a prerequisite to
successful entry.
80. Fischel, supra note 8, at 320.
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of one-twelfth of one percent of insured deposits each year by the FDIC or the
FSLIC. 8s The premium charged by these federally sponsored insurance agencies "is
assessed at a uniform rate to all institutions; no recognition is taken of the variations
in risk presented by variations in the composition of asset portfolios, in the matching
of asset and liability durations, in leverage ... in managerial competence or in other
factors relevant to failure." 82
Imagine an automobile insurance company charging the same premia to all
clients, from those with several convictions for drunk driving to those with perfect
driving records. Such a scheme would transfer wealth from safe drivers to risky
drivers. 83 Similarly, deposit insurance, by not charging higher premia to risky banks,
constitutes a federal subsidy to those shareholders of federally insured depository
institutions who cause their banks to engage in excessively risky activities.
Because of the way deposit insurance is priced, banks are not penalized by the
market when they shift their assets from relatively less risky to relatively more risky
investments:8 4 "[T]he uniform premium structure creates an incentive for the bank to
take higher risks than it would otherwise choose. ' 85 Moreover, the bigger the risks
a bank takes, the bigger the subsidy received by bank management. This is because
fixed price deposit insurance puts shareholders of an insured bank in the same
position as owners of an option to "sell" the bank to its federal insurers whenever the
value of the enterprise falls below the face value of the bank's assets. 86 This sort of
option contract is called a put option because it gives the owner the right to sell, or
"put," the underlying asset to the other party. 87 Generally, buyers of put options are
gambling that the value of the underlying asset (in this case the bank) will decline
because the option owner can then buy the underlying asset at the new, lower price
and then sell it to the other party at the higher price specified in the option contract.
The fact that fixed price deposit insurance has the same characteristics as a put
81. Because of recent demands on the FSLIC, the FSLIC currently is permitted to charge a special assessment of
1/8 of 1%.
82. K. Scott, supra note 8, at 7. Recent initiatives to reform the deposit insurance scheme, either by implementing
a risk-based premium pricing system, or by lowering the maximum amount of insurance from its present level of
$100,000, are unlikely to succeed due to political opposition from Congress and the Treasury Department. See Norton,
When You're in a Hole, Stop Digging, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Jan. 23, 1989, at 46.
83. Actually, in a world of competition among insurance companies, no safe drivers would purchase their insurance
from this company because companies that divide their insurance pools into safe drivers and risky drivers would be able
to offer lower rates to the safe drivers, and thereby out-compete an insurance company that failed to offer a lower rate
to safe drivers.
84. Other finms are penalized by the market because as fimns become riskier they must pay more to attract funds.
See Macey & Garrett, supra note I, at 218-19.
85. K. Scott, supra note 8, at 8; see also Macey & Garrett, supra note 1, at 219 ("fixed-priced deposit insurance
... benefits bank shareholders rather than depositors, as is generally thought, because a firm's stockholders, as residual
claimants to the firm's earnings, prefer the firm to pursue risky projects, whereas fixed claimants such as depositors, do
not"). See also Fischel, supra note 8, at 314:
As an illustration, consider two worlds-one where all deposits are uninsured and another where all deposits
are insured at a fixed insurance premium. In deciding whether to make an exceptionally risky loan, the bank in
the world of uninsured deposits must consider the probability that adding the loan to its portfolio of assets will
force it to pay more to attract and preserve deposits. In contrast, the funding costs of the bank in the world of
insured deposits and fixed insurance premiums are unaffected by the risky loan. Therefore, at the margin, the
bank in the second world has an incentive to make risky loans that it would not make but for insurance.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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option provides bank shareholders with incentives to engage in high levels of risk
taking because:
[o]ne of the central principles of option pricing theory is that the value of an option varies
directly with the riskiness of the underlying asset. Therefore, when the price of insurance is
fixed, increasing the riskiness of the loan portfolio increases the value of the deposit
insurance/put option, which redounds primarily to the benefit of the residual claimant-bank
shareholders.88
C. Bank Failures
The two most important components of bank failure policy concern the issue of
when an insolvent bank will be declared insolvent and the issue of how the assets of
a failed bank will be distributed after the decision to declare the bank insolvent has
been finally made.
As used here, a bank is considered "insolvent" when the present value of its
assets exactly equals the present value of its liabilities. Holders of equity interests in
the firm are wiped out at the moment of insolvency. But, if a bank can be closed at
the precise moment of insolvency, all fixed claims can be paid, and there will be no
losses to depositors or to the federal deposit insurance fund.8 9 As will be seen, current
policies regarding the disposition of insolvent banks cannot be reconciled with the
public interest.
1. The Timing of Bank Insolvencies
Timing the declaration of insolvency is crucial because if a failed bank remains
open after it is economically insolvent, the shareholders, who have nothing more to
lose if the bank continues its downhill slide, have a strong incentive to "roll the dice
one more time," or, in other words, to take extremely high risks in hope of a huge
payoff that will restore the value of their equity. But despite the fact that the FDIC
is the federal agency charged with administering the insurance fund for failed banks,
as well as for acting as the receiver for national banks, it does not have the power to
close an insolvent bank, or to petition a court for appointment of a receiver for an
insolvent bank.90
Instead, the Comptroller has the responsibility for closing FDIC insured national
banks, while the relevant state regulator has the authority to close state banks. These
state regulators do not have nearly the same incentives as the FDIC does to close
insolvent banks in a timely fashion because, unlike the FDIC, their performance is
not evaluated on the basis of whether they have preserved the economic integrity of
the deposit insurance fund. Rather, if these state regulators succumb to political
88. Id. (citing Black & Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. PoL. EcoN. 637 (1973)).
See also Moore, The Bust of '89, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP, Jan. 23, 1989, at 36, 38. The article describes how Texas
developers would take over small savings and loans and "turn them into high-performing investment vehicles." For the
developer, "[t]he beauty of it was that if their S&L gamble failed, they could walk away from it and federal deposit
insurance would pick up the tab. 'Heads I win, tails FSLIC loses,' was how they put it." Id.
89. This analysis assumes that the transaction costs of liquidating the bank are treated as a fixed claim, so that the
bank will be insolvent when the present value of its liabilities, plus the costs of liquidating the bank, equals the present
value of the bank's assets.
90. Sto Ns & WrE, supra note 43, at 600.
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pressure from the entities they regulate, and forbear from closing insolvent banks,
they receive the political benefits in the form of increased support from the regulated
entities, while all of the political costs are borne by the FDIC. For example, picture
a state FDIC insured bank that is losing 10,000 dollars a month. After the bank is
declared insolvent, those (mostly local) individuals and firms that have borrowed
from the bank will find it impossible to obtain additional credit from the bank and are
also likely to find that their loans are being called in earlier than they would like.
Local regulators can benefit these local interests at no cost to themselves by declining
to close the bank until long after it is insolvent. 91 In addition to borrowers, bank
officers and directors benefit if they can persuade their state regulators to let their
bank remain open because they will be able to retain their positions during that
period. 92 Shareholders also benefit when regulators decline to close their banks in a
timely fashion because they are given additional time to make last ditch attempts to
recoup their investments. Thus, the allocation of regulatory authority to declare banks
insolvent results in increased losses to the federal deposit insurance funds because
insolvent banks are kept open longer than is optimal from the perspective of their
federal insurers. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that state regulators are able
to benefit local parties at the expense of national interests by declining to close
insolvent depository institutions.
2. The Administration of Failed Banks
An elementary lesson in the study of the theory of corporate finance concerns the
conflict of interest between fixed claimants, who prefer the firms in which they invest
to pursue risk-free investment strategies, and residual claimants, who prefer the firms
in which they invest to undertake high risk investments. 93 In the absence of
regulations that distort incentives, this conflict of interest will be resolved in the
contracting process. Fixed claimants will accept a lower interest rate on the money
they invest in exchange for credible promises from the shareholders that the
shareholders will refrain from taking excessive risks with the fixed claimants'
money. 94
Thus, fixed claimants provide shareholders with a pecuniary incentive to refrain
from excessive risk-taking. Those shareholders who insist on engaging in risky
activities, or who are unable to offer credible promises that they will refrain from
91. The situation went from sad to deplorable when Jim Wright, the Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives, began exerting the considerable political pressure on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to induce it to
forbear from closing insolvent Texas savings and loan institutions. To the extent that Mr. Wright was successful in his
machinations, he was transferring wealth from a nationally sponsored insurance fund to local shareholders and debtors.
See Macey & Garrett, supra note 1, at 221-22.
92. Unlike rank and file workers, managerial employees generally lose their jobs when the banks for which they
work are declared insolvent.
93. See W. KLnN & J. Corrss, BustNEss ORoGzrszAON AND FNANcE: LEGAL AND EcooMc Psmciptms 207-09 (2d
ed. 1986).
94. See Smith & Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FiN. EcoN. 117 (1979)
(describing the various means by which contractual provisions in bond covenants insure that shareholders do not cause
their firms to increase risk above the contractually specified levels).
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risky activities, will be forced to bear a higher cost of capital in the form of higher
interest rates on fixed claims.
Depositors in federally insured banks are fixed claimants. Insurance on deposits
of less that 100,000 dollars gives these relatively small depositors no incentive to
extract contractual promises from the bank to refrain from excessive risk-taking
activities. Larger depositors, however, have the potential to utilize the contracting
process and the price-setting capabilities in the secondary market for large certificates
of deposit to exert a moderating influence on the risk-taking proclivities of bank
shareholders.
Unfortunately, the policies employed by the FDIC and the FSLIC for handling
the disposition of the assets and liabilities of failed banks "have transformed ... the
business of banking into a system that essentially guarantees full protection for every
depositor, regardless of the size of the deposit. ' 9 5 Indeed, regulators have employed
creative new strategies to avoid the traditional method of handling bank failures, the
deposit payoff, which involves having a receiver liquidate the assets of the banks and
make immediate payment to insured depositors up to the 100,000 dollar limit. Under
a deposit payoff approach, depositors with accounts above the 100,000 dollar insured
amount limit become general creditors of the bank for the uninsured portions of their
deposits, sharing "proceeds from the sale of the bank assets with other general
creditors (including the FDIC in its corporate capacity as insurer) on a pro rata basis
after the secured creditors have been paid. ", 96
The other two alternatives used to dispose of failed banks both provide full
protection, not only for statutorily insured depositors, but for all depositors. As such,
widespread use of these alternatives to the deposit payoff, purchase and assumption
transactions, and open-bank assistance programs, both deprive the regulatory system
of any of the benefits to be gained by having large depositors induce banks to refrain
from engaging in high levels of risk-taking. 97
In a purchase and assumption transaction, the federal insurer arranges an auction
for the failed bank. Other banks bid for the assets of the failed bank and the highest
bidder acquires these assets, along with all of the liabilities of the bank, such as
deposits. 98 Because "all of the failed banks deposit liabilities-including deposit
liabilities above 100,000 dollars-are assumed by the successful bidder" 99 in a
purchase and assumption transaction, if large depositors expect this procedure to be
used, they have no incentive to prompt the bank to refrain from engaging in excessive
risk-taking activities. And it seems clear that the purchase and assumption transaction
is the "strategy of choice" for federal regulators who handle bank failures. 1oo
Where, as in the case of the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
95. Macey & Garrett, supra note 1, at 217.
96. Id.
97. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 1172-93.
98. See Burgee, Purchase andAssumption Transactions under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 14 FORUt 1146,
1154-59 (1979); Gilbert, supra note 8, at 22; Norcross, The Bank Insolvency Game: FDIC Superpowers, the D'Oench
Doctrine, and Federal Common Law, 103 B.tVuNo L.J. 316, 348 n. 137 (1986).
99. Macey & Garrett, supra note 1, at 217-18.
100. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 1182.
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Company,' 0' the insolvent bank is so big that it is not possible for the regulators to
arrange a merger between the failed bank and a healthy bank, the federal insurers will
employ a regulatory device called open-bank assistance, which like the purchase and
assumption transaction, provides benefits to depositors in excess of the 100,000
dollar limit as well as to smaller depositors.'12 As the name implies, when open-bank
assistance plans are used, the troubled bank is not actually closed by its regulators.
Instead, the federal insurer provides financial support and assurances that "all
depositors and other general creditors of the bank will be fully protected and services
to the bank's customers will not be interrupted.' ' 0 3 These assurances come in the
form of guarantees of credit and other promises. The financial support comes in the
form of purchases of nonvoting preferred stock or debentures. 1° 4 Thus, where
open-bank assistance is used, not only are all depositors bailed out, regardless of their
size, but also the shareholders of insolvent banks are given an additional chance as
well. If the bank does well after it is given open-bank assistance, then its outstanding
shares will increase in value.
Thus, current bank failure policies remove any incentive that even the largest
creditors have to control risk-taking by banks. The clear beneficiaries of these
policies are bank shareholders. Shareholders of banks, unlike shareholders in other
firms, are free to increase the value of their shares by increasing the riskiness of their
banks. In addition, they can do so without fear of economic reprisal from fixed
claimants (depositors) because fixed claimants are insulated from the consequences of
increased riskiness by deposit insurance and bank failure policies.
Therefore, both bank failure policies and deposit insurance pricing policies are
consistent with the political theory which posits that bank regulators are "captured"
by the firms they purportedly regulate. Both regulatory systems are set up so as to
subsidize any additional levels of risk assumed by bank shareholders.10 5 The political
101. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC and Federal Reserve Board, A Permanent Assistance
Program for Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, IssuEs m BANK REG., Spring 1984, at 6; Joint News
Release of FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve Board, (May 17, 1984), reprinted in Gilbert,
supra note 8, at 24.
102. Statement of Policy and Criteria on Assistance to Operating Insured Banks, 51 Fed. Reg. 44, 122-23 (FDIC
1986) (describing recent guidelines and conditions under which the FDIC will make open-bank assistance available to
troubled banks).
103. See Gilbert, supra note 8, at 24 (quoting Joint News Release of the FDIC, the Comptroller, and the Federal
Reserve Board).
104. Id. at 22.
105. See Macey & Garrett, supra note 1, at 221:
To the extent that bank regulatory policy is influenced by the regulated entities, this policy will not force banks
to internalize the full costs of the risks associated with their activities. In fact, over a wide range of regulatory
issues, this constituency may be as likely to lead bank regulators away from solutions to the bank failure
problem as towards solutions.
(citations omitted).
Other restrictions, such as entry restrictions, lending limits, and capital adequacy requirements, seem to do a better
job of reducing excessive risk-taking by banks, but, upon closer inspection, they have little impact on the problem. Entry
restrictions increase prices for consumers by restricting competition, but they do not restrict banks from making risky
loans. Contrary to popular belief, bank lending limits are quite liberal. A bank's basic lending limit is 15% of its
unimpaired capital and surplus. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1982). The expansion of the base from which a bank's lending limit is
calculated from capital to capital plus unimpaired surplus "gave the Comptroller significant flexibility to define the
lending limit." Smois & WnrrE, supra note 43, at 177.
Requiring banks to maintain certain percentages of equity in their capital structure is another way of furthering the
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problem facing the nation was illustrated most poignantly at the "posh Ocean Reef
Club" in Key Largo, Florida where staff and members of the House and Senate Bank
Committees "were treated to an all-expenses four day junket" by a banking industry
financed foundation named after Senator Jake Garn. The trip was scheduled to
coincide with the evaluation by Congress of alternative proposals for bailing out the
troubled savings and loan industry.10 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The previous Parts have shown how the current structure of bank regulation
makes it unusually easy for banks to capture the administrative agencies and
committees that are supposed to regulate them. This political capture translates into
a series of banking policies that not only lead to, but also encourage, excessive
risk-taking by federally insured depository institutions. Regulators cannot be ex-
pected to have the same incentives to monitor and control risk-taking as private sector
actors, whose own money is at stake. As such, the only solutions to the problems
created by our current regulatory regime will be to either provide regulators with
direct monetary incentives for success, or else to privatize bank regulation. For
example, some authorities have suggested that private insurance be employed as an
alternative to federal deposit insurance. 107 Others, myself included, have suggested
that bank regulatory policies be changed to provide additional monitoring of bank
management by permitting a more robust market for bank control 08 and by changing
the policies for administering failed banks.1 09 Obviously, the way that deposit
insurance is priced should be changed, 1 0 and the FDIC should be given the authority
to close insolvent depository institutions.
At present, short term political considerations appear to take priority over long
term economic consequences. This suggests that the deeper problem is not devising
workable and satisfactory solutions to the problems of risk-taking by banks. Rather,
the deeper problem, which appears intractable, is how to design a political system
that provides regulators with incentives to make public-regarding decisions, and how
to provide politicians with incentives to establish such a system once we know how
to design it.
interests of bank safety. This equity provides a cushion for depositors and the insurance funds in the event of insolvency.
The FDIC has determined that 5% is the minimum acceptable level for equity capital, and that 6% is the preferred level
for healthy institutions. Id. at 290. This means that banks can have 94% of their assets in the form of insured deposits
and only 6% of their assets in the form of equity.
106. See Fenyuesi, Bankers' Holiday, U.S. NEws & WoRLD RE., Nov. 21, 1988, at 21, col. 1.
107. See Fischel, supra note 8, at 316-17.
108. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1.
109. Id.
110. K. Scott, supra note 8, at 37 ("[lIt seems highly desirable to remove the perverse incentives of the present
premium structure.").
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